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Weather radar systems are an important tool in commercial aviation to safeguard the safety and security
of aircraft. However, the utility of weather radar systems lies in the accuracy and the reliability of the
interpretations of the displays. The primary aim of this study was to determine whether experienced
pilots could be clustered based on their assessments of the turbulence associated with simulated
weather radar displays and whether these groups corresponded to differences in experience-related
metrics. Sixty one participants completed a series of on-line scenarios in which they were asked to
rate the level of turbulence associated with 11 simulated weather radar displays. They were also asked to
indicate their conﬁdence in being able to continue the ﬂight for 80 nautical miles in the absence of an
alteration in track or altitude. A cluster analysis reliably differentiated two groups of participants and
these groups corresponded to differences in the capacity to discriminate between weather radar sce-
narios. The results also reveal both a lack of reliability in experienced pilots’ interpretations of weather
radar displays and difﬁculties associated with classiﬁcations of expertise on the basis of experienced-
related metrics. At an empirical level, the outcomes have implications for assessments of expertise in
domains in which ideal performance is difﬁcult to establish. From an industry perspective, the results
reveal important differences in the interpretation of weather radar displays amongst experienced,
qualiﬁed pilots. This suggests a need for both more effective weather radar design, complemented by
more reliable and comprehensive training that focuses on the accurate interpretation of different types of
weather radar returns.
Relevance to industry: The research highlights the difﬁculties that pilots face in interpreting weather
radar displays accurately and emphasises the need for new designs and more effective training
initiatives.
 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Weather radar systems represent one of the devices integral to
aviators’ capacity to transport passengers safely and efﬁciently to
their destination. However, they are also complex systems, the
interpretation of which can be problematic. In at least two cases,
aircraft have been involved in serious occurrences as a direct result
of the misinterpretation of the weather radar returns (Australian
Transport Safety Bureau, 2001; Civil Aviation Department of Hong
Kong, 2005). While anecdotal, these occurrences suggest that062.
Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-NDdifﬁculties may occur in interpreting weather radar returns under
particular operational and environmental conditions.
The interpretation of weather phenomena amongst pilots is,
inevitably, subject to a degree of uncertainty. Moreover, the infor-
mation that forms the basis of an expectation is often derived from
a number of relatively disparate sources, including forecasts, verbal
reports, written reports, and weather radar returns (Keel et al.,
2000). As a result, the diagnostic process in response to weather
phenomena can be idiosyncratic, to the extent that different ob-
servers may interpret the same weather conditions as either
favourable or unfavourable (Beringer and Ball, 2004).
Empirically, the accuracy of interpretations of weather-related
phenomena amongst aviators has been examined from three
distinct perspectives. Underlying each of these perspectives is the
assumption that the outcome is a product, in part, of diagnostic
assessments of the risks associated with continuing a ﬂight. These
differences in the assessment of risk have variously been attributed
to an overwhelming motivation to reach a destination; differences license.
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situations.
The motivation to reach the destination has been a relatively
pervasive explanation for differences in the interpretation of
weather phenomena amongst visually-rated pilots (Knecht et al.,
2005). In this case, it is assumed that pilots underestimate the
severity of the weather conditions as a result of an overwhelming
desire to reach a destination. Prospect theory may provide an
explanation for this behaviour, since there is evidence to suggest
that individuals tend to be risk-seeking when an outcome, such as
reaching a destination, is perceived as a gain, and risk-averse when
an outcome is interpreted in terms of a loss (O’Hare and Smitheran,
1995). Conceivably, pilots may be attending to the perceived gains
associated with reaching the destination such that they are pre-
pared to accept greater risks associated with the weather
conditions.
Enduring differences in perceptions of risk are generally asso-
ciated with differences in personality characteristics, to the extent
that some individuals are persistently more risk averse or risk-
seeking than others (Machin and Sankey, 2008). Risk-seeking
behaviour, in particular, has been positively associated with a
range of personality characteristics including extraversion and
sensation-seeking (Hunter, 2006; Hunter et al., 2011). While dif-
ferences in personality have been indirectly associated with dif-
ferences in the interpretation of weather phenomena, this link has
been difﬁcult to establish conclusively, since much of the work is
based on either post-hoc investigations of aircraft accidents and/or
paper-and-pencil hypothetical scenarios.
Clearly, differences in the interpretation of weather phenomena
may also reﬂect differences in the skills of operators. Both task-
related experience and recent experience as a pilot have been
associated with the accuracy and reliability of the interpretation of
weather-related conditions (Wiggins and O’Hare,1995). Differences
have also been observed in the features of weather phenomena to
which experts and novices attend in responding to weather-related
phenomena (Wiggins and O’Hare, 2003b). This suggests that the
value of ‘experience’ in the interpretation of weather-related phe-
nomena may lie in the acquisition of speciﬁc features that can be
used to interpret and thereby anticipate deteriorating weather
conditions during ﬂight.
Where features are associated with events in memory, the
resulting construct is referred to as a cue, and it is this association
that is presumed to direct human performance as part of a broader
mental model (Rosen et al., 2010; Wiggins, 2006, 2012; Wiggins
and O’Hare, 2003a). A mental model constitutes a representation,
in memory, of the relationship between a series of cues that are
embodied within feature-event relations (Doane et al., 2004).
Theoretically, it is the sophistication of the relationship between
cues that enables the accurate and reliable assessment of weather-
related phenomena. For example, it may be the case that features
are coincident, to the extent that triggering one cue will initiate
other, related cues that enables the generation of an expectation as
to the future sequence of events. This perspective is consistent with
theories of situational awareness whereby operators acquire and
integrate information about the current state of a system and, by
referring to a mental model, are capable of projecting the state of
the system at some point in the future (Endsley, 1995).
The acquisition and interpretation of information immediately
available to an operator is referred to as ‘situation assessment’ since
it involves the acquisition of information sufﬁcient to form an un-
derstanding of the current state of a system (Klein, 2008). Ac-
cording to Uhlarik and Comerforf (2002), situation assessment is a
precursor to the projection of information to form a prospective
diagnosis of the state of the system at some time in the future.
Therefore, situation assessment and prospective diagnoses aredistinct, but related constructs, the accuracy of which are depen-
dent upon feature-event relationships that comprise the operators’
mental model.
Practitioners are presumed to acquire a repertoire of feature-
event relations as a product of their interaction with the opera-
tional environment. As interactions occur, operators are able to
extract from the environment the causal relations that become
evident. The extraction of these causal relationships initially re-
quires the identiﬁcation of key features and the generation of
relatively broad relationships between these features and the
associated events. The nature of these relationships is such that
they may not necessarily be reﬁned to the extent that they can be
applied accurately across a range of situations. Nevertheless,
repeated exposure will enable the relationships between features
and events to become more reﬁned, so that eventually, operators
are capable of responding to nuances that may remain undetected
by less experienced operators. This is consistent with Anderson’s
(1993) notion of ‘tuning’ in production-based reasoning. It is this
combination of cue speciﬁcity and the sophistication of the re-
lationships between cues, that may explain expert practitioners’
capacity to consistently undertake quite complex activities accu-
rately, with little apparent cognitive load.
Since the acquisition of feature-event relations in the form of
cues relies on the individual skills and capabilities of the operator,
different experiences will, inevitably, result in distinctive repre-
sentations of the environment (Morrison et al., 2013). Therefore,
the cues on which performance is based will also differ, so that
different operators will engage distinctive strategies to acquire,
process, and respond to task-related information. In the case of
operators with relatively greater levels of task-related experience,
these differences in the acquisition of information will not
necessarily impact the accuracy or consistency of their in-
terpretations, since there are often multiple paths to a conclusion,
particularly in complex, uncertain environments (Schvaneveldt
et al., 2001).
The notion that experts, as a cohort, generate relatively consis-
tent, accurate assessments under uncertainty, conﬂicts with
research that purports to demonstrate that experts are no more
accurate than novices. This observation stemmed from the early
work in expert-novice differences pioneered by Dawes et al. (1989)
and was extended by researchers in a number of different domains,
including assessments of bank loan applications (Andersson, 2004)
and the sorting of task-related information amongst pilots
(Schvaneveldt et al., 2001). In general, this research has involved
the deﬁnition of ‘expertise’ a priori, either by using the number of
hours accumulated in the performance of a task or by using the
well-established principle of ten years experience in a particular
role or occupation (Hoffman et al., 1995; O’Hare et al., 1998). Clearly,
the difﬁculty with this approach is that there is an assumption that
expertise has been acquired by virtue of the length of experience,
rather than the quality of the experience to which the operator has
been exposed.
If diagnostic expertise is dependent upon the identiﬁcation and
extraction of featureeevent relationships, it is the rate of exposure
and the extent to which associations are drawn that will determine
the progression to expertise. This progression may or may not
correspond to metrics of experience such as the number of hours
ﬂown or the frequency with which a piece of equipment is used.
Rather, expertise is more likely to be distinguished on the basis of
performance, and particularly where the application of feature-
event relations offers an advantage. Consequently, the primary
aim of the present study was to determine whether, amongst a
cohort of experienced pilots, differences in situation assessment
and prospective diagnoses are evident in response to a series of
weather radar displays.
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that they are employed for both situation assessment and pro-
spective diagnoses within the aviation domain. Moreover, since the
operators of weather radar displays are pilots, reasonably reliable
metrics of operational experience are available in the form of the
number of ﬂight hours accumulated within speciﬁed contexts.
Finally, the nature of weather radar displays is such that it is
possible to develop scenarios, the interpretation of which demands
the application of featureeevent relationships.
Where previous approaches to the assessment of expertise have
typically involved comparisons between experts and novices, the
present study draws on differences in performance amongst pilots
who have already accumulated extensive experience. Therefore, it
was important to establish criteria that were capable of differen-
tiating ‘experienced’ from ‘expert’ performance. Although the ac-
curacy of responses was an obvious option, the ecological nature of
the stimuli was such that any assessment of accuracy would be
based on the opinions of subject-matter experts who would have
required identiﬁcation as experts a priori.
In the case of ecological stimuli, more objective indicators of
expertise include the consistency with which the performance of
expert and non-expert groups are differentiated across different
scenarios (Hughson and Boakes, 2001), and the level of discrimi-
nation evident in the interpretation of scenarios (Weiss and
Shanteau, 2003). This is consistent with the assertion that experts
have acquired more ﬁnely tuned cueeevent relations and that this
enables greater levels of precision in diagnostic assessments in
comparison to non-experts.
There is also evidence to suggest that experts tend to be rela-
tively more consistent in their assessments of identical stimuli
(Shanteau et al., 2002). This consistency in performance is based on
the repertoire of featureeevent relations in memory which obvi-
ates the requirement for analogy and reduces the potential for
inconsistent responses. In summary, it was hypothesised that:
(a) Amongst a cohort of experienced pilots, distinct groups
would emerge based on their collective situation assess-
ments of the turbulence associated with a series of 11
simulated weather radar displays;
(b) The groups identiﬁed would correspond to differences in the
level of discrimination between prospective diagnoses of the
likelihood that, based on the weather conditions depicted, an
alteration in track or altitude would be necessary within the
next 80 nautical miles;
(c) The groups identiﬁed would not necessarily be related to
experience-related metrics and/or individual preferences in
the use of technology; and that
(d) An interaction would be evident between groups classiﬁed
on the basis of their situation assessments and the consis-
tency of their assessments of turbulence in response to
identical weather radar displays.Fig. 1. Example of a weather radar display used in the study.2. Method
2.1. Participants
The participants comprised 61 pilots with a mean age of 41.5
(SD ¼ 9.6) years, each of whom had accumulated at least 1000
cross-country ﬂying experience. Consistent with Wiggins and
O’Hare (1995), these pilots might generally be considered to have
acquired sufﬁcient exposure in the operational environment to
have developed expertise. Overall, the respondents had accumu-
lated a median 150 ﬂight hours (Range ¼ 30e300 h) over the 90
days preceding their completion of the survey, and reported amean4250 h (Range ¼ 340e25500 h) using weather radar displays. The
majority of pilots (68.3%) indicated that they operated primarily
within the Asia-Paciﬁc region.
2.2. Stimuli
The stimuli comprised a series of 12 simulated weather radar
scenarios that were accessible via the internet. Two of the scenarios
were identical to enable an assessment of the reliability of re-
sponses. Each scenario contained a static weather radar return (see
Fig. 1) to which participants were asked to respond. The returns
were developed to reﬂect a generic weather radar system and were
preceded by an exemplar weather radar return and associated
legend. For each weather radar return, participants were asked to
assume that the aircraft was heading 340 at Flight Level 230 with
the wind from 250 at 22 knots. They were also asked to assume
that the tilt was set at 1.5 degrees.
In responding to the simulated weather radar scenarios, partic-
ipants were asked to estimate, on a six-point Likert scale, their
conﬁdence in being able to continue the ﬂight for the next 80
nautical miles without an alteration in track or altitude. They were
also asked to recall the speciﬁc features that led to this assessment
and estimate, on a three-point scale (High, Moderate, Low), their
estimates of the severity of the turbulence, updrafts and downdrafts
if the aircraft was to maintain the altitude and the track depicted.
2.3. Procedure
The participants were recruited through a number of aviation-
related websites. Consent and information sheets were available
on-line. Participants progressed systematically through the sce-
narios, and there was no requirement to answer all of the questions
pertaining to one scenario prior to progressing to subsequent sce-
narios. Once participants had completed the sequence of scenarios,
they submitted the responses electronically via a ’submit’ button.
The scenarios were available over a four-week period.
3. Results
3.1. Cluster analysis
The initial aim of the present study was to determine whether it
was possible to distinguish pilots based on their situation assess-
ments of the turbulence associated with each of 11 weather radar
returns. Scenario 8 was excluded from the cluster analysis as it
Table 1
Analyses of Variance outcomes and means for estimates of the level of turbulence
associated with the 11 weather radar scenarios for which cluster group assignment
constitutes the independent variable.
Group 1 (SD) Group 2 (SD) F df p
Scenario 1 1.38 (0.55) 2.37 (0.49) 53.09 1,60 0.00**
Scenario 2 1.44 (0.50) 2.41 (0.50) 55.63 1,60 0.00**
Scenario 3 2.06 (0.55) 2.37 (0.49) 5.30 1,60 0.05*
Scenario 4 1.32 (0.53) 1.93 (0.55) 18.63 1,60 0.00**
Scenario 5 2.14 (0.58) 2.74 (0.45) 20.25 1,60 0.00**
Scenario 6 1.06 (0.24) 1.44 (0.58) 12.52 1,60 0.00**
Scenario 7 1.06 (0.24) 1.41 (0.57) 10.37 1,60 0.00**
Scenario 9 1.88 (0.59) 2.15 (0.46) 3.70 1,60 0.05
Scenario 10 2.26 (0.62) 2.52 (0.58) 2.67 1,60 0.11
Scenario 11 2.71 (0.52) 2.63 (0.49) 0.34 1,60 0.56
Scenario 12 2.68 (0.47) 2.78 (0.42) 0.75 1,60 0.39
* Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at 0.05.
** Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at 0.001.
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two-step cluster analysis using Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion and
incorporating the estimates of turbulence as the input variables
yielded a two-group solution of fair quality. One group comprised
34 participants and the other comprised 27 participants. The
groups differed consistently in their assessments of turbulence
across seven of the 11 weather radar scenarios (see Table 1). In each
case, Group 2 rated the turbulence at a level signiﬁcantly greater
than Group 1.3.2. Cluster groups and expertise
Although the cluster analysis of the situation assessments yiel-
ded a two-group solution, it was important to establish whether
these groups represent differences in expertise or some other
construct associated with the interpretation of weather radar
returns. While an assessment of accuracy would have been ideal,
the nature of ecological stimuli is such that absolute accuracy can
be difﬁcult to establish, particularly over a series of trials. However,
Weiss and Shanteau (2003) offer an alternative approach to
assessment suggesting that experts differ from non-experts in their
capacity to discriminate between different scenarios.
In the present study, participants were asked, for each scenario,
to indicate their level of conﬁdence in their capacity to continue the
ﬂight for 80 nautical miles without an alteration in track or altitude.
Consistent with the principles outlined by Weiss and Shanteau
(2003), the variance in responses to the 11 scenarios was calcu-
lated for each participant as a measure of discrimination. These
data were subject to a one-way ANOVA incorporating the cluster
group assignment as the independent variable and the variance in
responses across the 11 scenarios as the dependent variable. The
results revealed a statistically signiﬁcant difference between the
groups, F (1,59)¼ 7.06, p< 0.02, h2¼ 0.11. This suggests that the two
groups differed in the variance of responses to the scenarios with
Group 1 (M ¼ 3.42, SE ¼ 0.21) recording a relatively greater
aggregated variance than Group 2 (M ¼ 2.57, SE ¼ 0.24).3.3. Reliability of responses
The reliability of the interpretations of weather radar returns
was examined by comparing participants’ responses to two, iden-
tical displays (Scenarios one and eight). A two by two mixed
methods ANOVA, incorporating two levels of cluster group as a
between-groups, independent variable and two levels of scenario
as the within groups variable, tested whether differences emerged
in the estimated turbulence and conﬁdence to continue the ﬂight
for 80 nautical miles in the absence of a change in altitude or track.In the case of estimated turbulence, the results revealed a main
effect for Scenario, F (1,59) ¼ 6.59, p < 0.02, h2 ¼ 0.10, and a main
effect for Cluster Group, F(1,59) ¼ 56.55, p < 0.001, h2 ¼ 0.49. This
suggests that differences emerged in the interpretation of the tur-
bulence associated with the two weather radar returns, and that
the relative differences in the interpretation of the two returns
remained consistent for both groups of pilots.
In the case of participants’ ratings of conﬁdence in their capacity
to continue the ﬂight, a two by two mixed methods ANOVA,
incorporating two levels of cluster group as a between-groups,
independent variable and two levels of scenario as the within
groups variable failed to reveal a statistically signiﬁcant main effect
for Scenario, F(1,59) ¼ 2.37, p ¼ 0.13, h2 ¼ 0.04. However, a statis-
tically signiﬁcant main effect was evident for Cluster Group,
F(1,59) ¼ 4.08, p < 0.05, h2 ¼ 0.07. Consistent with the results
associated with estimates of turbulence, there was no statistically
signiﬁcant interaction evident. In combination, these results sug-
gest that, across both weather radar scenarios, the cluster groups
rated similarly, their conﬁdence in continuing the ﬂight for 80
nautical miles without and alteration in track or altitude. This
occurred despite the fact that the perceived ratings of turbulence
differed for the two scenarios.
3.4. Coincidence with experience metrics
Although there has been considerable criticism associated with
the use of experience-related metrics as the basis of assessments of
expertise (e.g Shanteau et al., 2002; Stokes et al., 1997), their
application remains relatively commonplace, particularly within
the novice-expert paradigm. In the case of the comparisons be-
tween competent practitioners and experts, the accuracy of such
surrogate measures of expertise remains unclear. Nevertheless, it
might be argued that these measures are most effective in dis-
tinguishing performance at the extremes (novice versus expert),
since the transition from competence to expertise is more likely to
be impacted by a complex interaction between experience and
individual differences in skill acquisition.
To establish whether experience-related metrics were related to
performance across the weather radar scenarios, a multiple
regression was conducted with the number of hours accumulated
as pilot in command and the self-assessed experiencewith weather
radar system as predictor variables, and the variance in the conﬁ-
dence that the ﬂight could be continued for 80 nautical miles
without an alteration in track of altitude as the dependent variable.
The predictor variables were selected on the basis that they
represent more domain general (hours as pilot in command) and
more domain speciﬁc (experience with weather radar systems)
experience metrics. However, the results failed to reveal any rela-
tionship between the variables, suggesting that, at a linear level,
experience metrics failed to predict aggregated performance across
the weather radar scenarios (F (2,57) ¼ 0.23, p ¼ 0.79).
An alternative approach to the assessment of the role of
experience-related metrics involves determining whether the
cluster groups can be differentiated on the basis of the number of
ﬂight hours accumulated as pilot in command and/or the self-
assessed use of weather radar. The results indicated that neither
the hours accumulated as pilot in command (F (1,59) ¼ 0.32,
p¼ 0.58) nor the self-assessed use of weather radar (F (1,58) ¼ 1.57,
p ¼ 0.22) were differentiated by the group to which participants
had been assigned as part of the cluster analysis.
3.5. Individual differences and weather radar
Although experience and the associated skills that develop are
undoubtedly signiﬁcant in determining responses to the weather
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together with reliance on such systems, may also impact assess-
ments. Therefore, a series of bivariate correlations was conducted
between self-assessments of trust in, and reliance on, weather ra-
dar systems and the aggregated variance in conﬁdence in
continuing the ﬂight for 80 nautical miles in the absence of a
change in track or altitude. No signiﬁcant relationships were
evident for trust inweather radar systems (r (44)¼0.13, p¼ 0.39)
nor reliance onweather radar systems (r (44) ¼ 0.24, p ¼ 0.12), and
variance in the conﬁdence in continuing the ﬂight. This suggests
that variance in perceived conﬁdence to continue the ﬂight for 80
nautical miles in the absence of a change in track or altitude is not
mediated by perceived trust in, nor reliance on, weather radar
systems.
4. Discussion
The primary aims of the present study were to determine: (a)
whether, amongst an experienced cohort, two groups of partici-
pants could reliably be clustered on the basis of their assessments
of the turbulence associated with a series of weather radar sce-
narios; (b) whether the two groups identiﬁed corresponded to
differences in prospective diagnoses associated with scenarios; and
(c) whether the groups identiﬁed corresponded to differences in
experience-relatedmetrics and/or individual preferences in the use
of technology. The interpretation of weather radar systems was
selected as the domain of interest since it is a technology that in-
volves a degree of uncertainty, offers a level of experimental con-
trol, and provides the ecological validity necessary for
investigations of expertise.
Pilots were recruited for the study on the basis that they held a
minimum level of experience in cross-country ﬂight. This strategy
was intended to ensure that the cohort incorporated competent
through to highly experienced (expert) practitioners. Theoretical
models of skill acquisition suggest that competence and expertise
represent distinct groups that can be distinguished on the basis of
their performance (Holyoak, 1991). In the case of weather radar
systems, successful performance involves the accurate interpreta-
tion of theweather conditions displayed and, most importantly, the
extent to which turbulence is likely to impact the safety and se-
curity of the aircraft and its passengers. Neither the severity nor the
extent of the turbulence is displayed directly by weather radar
displays and it must be inferred on the basis of the atmospheric
moisture depicted.
Given the relative uncertainty associated with interpretations of
turbulence, it represented a useful metric against which the per-
formance of participants could be assessed. However, the uncer-
tainty associated with estimates of turbulence also presented
difﬁculties in establishing objectively, the accuracy of judgments.
Consequently, it was reasoned that, across a number of scenarios,
consistent differences in performance ought to emerge sufﬁcient to
allow the identiﬁcation of distinct groups. A cluster analysis
conﬁrmed both a two group, cluster analysis solution and the
consistency with which these differences occurred. Indeed, of the
11 scenarios that were included in the cluster analysis seven
discriminated signiﬁcantly between the two groups. The consis-
tency with which the two groups differed provides some conﬁ-
dence to suggest that the groups represented distinctive levels of
performance.
The validity of the clusters was further established through a
comparison of the aggregate variance of pilots’ ratings of conﬁ-
dence on being able to continue a ﬂight without an alteration in
track or altitude. On the basis of Weiss and Shanteau (2003), it was
assumed that a greater variance in responses would reﬂect a degree
of discrimination between the different scenarios; a characteristicof expertise. Consistent with expectations, a statistically signiﬁcant
difference in the aggregated variances was identiﬁed in which
Group 1 better reﬂected, at least in part, the characteristics of
expertise than did Group 2.
Although both the assessments of turbulence and conﬁdence in
continuing the ﬂight related to the same scenarios, it should be
noted that where the assessment of turbulence was based on an
interpretation of the information displayed, the assessment of
conﬁdence in continuing the ﬂight required a prospective diagnosis
beyond the information that was immediately presented. More-
over, the cluster analysis was conducted using the absolute ratings
of turbulence where the assessment of conﬁdence in continuing
the ﬂight was based on the aggregated variance in the ratings
across scenarios.
Support for the notion that situation assessment and prospec-
tive diagnosis require distinct but related cognitive skills can be
drawn from the reliability analysis of responses across Scenarios
one and eight. Importantly, where a statistically signiﬁcant differ-
ence emerged between the situation assessments of turbulence, no
such difference was evident for prospective diagnoses relating to
the requirement for an altitude or track change. However, these
results also suggest that neither cluster group interpreted the tur-
bulence associated with the two scenarios consistently despite the
fact that the scenarios were identical.
From a theoretical perspective, the lack of reliability associated
with the interpretation of identical scenarios is inconsistent with
contemporary perspectives of expertise in which consistency in
situation assessments are normally assumed (Shanteau et al., 2002;
Shanteau,1988). On this basis, it might be argued that neither of the
groups of participants represented experts. Alternatively, the lack of
consistency in the interpretation may be explained by the position
of the two identical scenarios as the ﬁrst and the eight scenarios to
be interpreted by participants. Although participants had been
exposed to the elements of the displays prior to the data acquisition
process, they had not been asked tomake judgments. Consequently,
it remains unclear whether the inconsistency in the interpretation
of turbulence related to the sequence in which the scenarios were
presented or whether it reﬂects an actual lack of expertise.
Although there is some indication to suggest that the cluster
groups reﬂect consistent differences in prospective diagnostic per-
formance, it is also possible that the outcomes represent individual
differences in trust and reliance on weather radar systems. This is
especially likely in cases where participants are asked to rate their
conﬁdence in being able to undertake a task successfully. Although
the intention in seeking pilots’ ratings of conﬁdence was to target
prospective diagnostic skills, there is little doubt that individual
differences in the perception of trust in weather radar technology
and the reliance onweather systemsmayaccount for a proportion of
the variance in the responses. However, bivariate correlations failed
to reveal any signiﬁcant relationship between self-assessed per-
ceptions of both trust and reliance on weather radar systems, and
the variance in pilots’ conﬁdence in being able to continue the ﬂight
for 80 nautical miles in the absence of a change in altitude or track.
This suggests that any differences evident in ratings of conﬁdence
are due to factors other than individual differences inperceived trust
and reliance on weather radar systems.
4.1. Implications for assessments of diagnostic expertise
The present study was conceived on the premise that experi-
ence metrics of expertise do not necessarily distinguish the per-
formance of what might be regarded as competent or higher-level
operators, and so-called true experts. This is signiﬁcant insofar as
the goal of training is as much to facilitate the transition from
competence to expertise as it is from novice to competence.
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distinguish performers at different levels of skill acquisition both
for the purposes of assessment and for the implementation of
remedial strategies if necessary.
The outcomes of the present study revealed that two groups of
operators could be distinguished within a cohort of highly experi-
enced pilots. Further, the groups could be classiﬁed on the basis of
their relatively consistent performance across different scenarios.
Finally, the two groups identiﬁed did not relate to differences in
experience metrics, including the number of ﬂight hours accumu-
lated as pilot in command and self assessments of experience using
weather radar systems. These results suggest that experience
metrics do not have the precision to distinguish differences in
performance at relatively higher levels of skill acquisition. As a
consequence, there is a need to consider the development of
cognitive competencies and whether these can be used to establish
markers of the acquisition of cognitive skills.
4.2. Limitations and future research
One of the most signiﬁcant limitations associated with the
present research concerned the use of static, rather than dynamic
stimuli with which pilots would have been familiar. In the opera-
tional context, there is also an option for pilots to increase or
decrease the ‘tilt’ to establish the vertical pattern of weather phe-
nomena. Finally, pilots were presented with a set of scenarios that
represented a generic system. While this strategy was designed to
ensure to reduce the impact of differences in pilots’ experiencewith
different systems, it may have limited the relative advantage
afforded by expertise. Nevertheless, the nature of the stimuli was
such that any reduction in performance thatmay have occurred as a
result of the lack of familiarity with the precise display was
distributed across all participants.
Although relatively consistent differences in performance were
evident across the groups identiﬁed through the cluster analysis, it
is unclear whether these groups actually represent differences in
expertise. Of particular concern, was the lack of reliability in the
interpretation of the turbulence associated with Scenarios 1 and 8.
While methodological issues may offer an explanation for the lack
of consistency, it is important to establish an objective assessment
of prospective diagnostic performance in which reliability can be
assured. The present paper goes someway towards establishing the
basis for this process.
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